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Abstract
The extension of credit to SMEs in Ireland has been identiﬁed as a necessary condition for economic
recovery and job growth. The debate on whether the reduction in credit to this sector is caused
by credit rationing by banks or a lack of credit demand on the part of SMEs has received much
attention in media and policy circles. Owing to a lack of relevant available micro-data, research on
this issue in Ireland has been sparse to date. The aim of this paper is to provide evidence using
recently available ﬁrm-level data from the Central Statistics Oﬃce and the European Central Bank.
Using the CSO data, we ﬁnd a moderate decline in credit applications, coupled with a very large
increase in credit rejection rates. Using ﬁrm-level production data, we ﬁnd no evidence that the
accepted ﬁrms have been pooled according to ﬁrm performance - more productive and fast-growing
ﬁrms are as likely to be rejected as any other ﬁrm. Using the ECB data, we show that Irish ﬁrms
are 15 to 18 percent more likely to be rejected for credit than a comparable Eurozone SME. We
show also that Irish ﬁrms are less likely to have had decreased credit demand than other Eurozone
SMEs in the 2009-10 period.
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at which this paper was read. The views expressed in this paper are our own, and do not necessarily
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2Non Technical Summary
Ireland experienced an unprecedented credit boom in the years leading up to 2008, before contracting
sharply, falling by 18% over the past two years. This paper uses ﬁrm level data to assess how small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) perceive current credit conditions and takes some tentative steps
towards disentangling the relative eﬀects of changes in supply versus demand in explaining the
change in credit.
SMEs account for a considerable proportion of economic activity in most countries. The SME
group accounts for the vast majority of enterprises in the EU and employs more than half of the
labour force. To date, it has been diﬃcult to assess how the diﬃculties in the banking sector
have been impacting on SMEs. The available data on ﬁrms’ interactions with the credit market
is limited, with even the most comprehensive Irish ﬁrm-level datasets providing no information on
ﬁrms’ ﬁnances or borrowings.
This paper presents analysis of two surveys of Irish SMEs, both of which draw their samples
from the whole relevant population and thus provides the ﬁrst objective evidence on ﬁrms’ demand
for credit and experience of supply decisions.
Using the Access to Finance survey carried out by the Central Statistics Oﬃce, we place the
changes in the Irish SME credit market between 2007 and 2010 in a European context. We ﬁnd
that, even controlling for decreases in GDP, the tightening in Irish credit supply appears among the
most extreme in Europe. We then match the survey data with quantitative information from other
CSO sources and use it to compare the characteristics of rejected and accepted ﬁrms along a number
of performance dimensions, such as productivity, sales, growth and the ﬁrm’s relative position in
their sector. This allows us to determine if there is evidence of sorting by quality of the ﬁrms that
successfully accessed credit in 2010. No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences could be found between
accepted and rejected ﬁrms on the basis of observable ﬁrm characteristics.
The second set of data is the Survey of Access to Finance in Europe (SAFE) which is a biannual
survey carried out by the European Central Bank across all Euro member states. We make use of
this data to compare Irish ﬁrms to similar Eurozone ﬁrms using matching techniques. This allows
us to address the question of whether Irish ﬁrms are diﬀerent from comparable Eurozone ﬁrms in
terms of their changes in credit demand in 2009-10 and the degree to which they have been rationed
credit. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in Ireland are less likely to have decreased their demand for credit than
comparable ﬁrms in the Euro area as a whole or when compared to the peripheral crisis countries.
Irish ﬁrms are also signiﬁcantly more likely to have been refused credit than their counterparts
elsewhere.1 Introduction
Ireland experienced an unprecedented credit boom in the years leading up to 2008. Outstanding
credit to private sector Irish resident ﬁrms grew by 194% beween 2003 and the peak in March
2009, as shown in Figure 1. Since then, credit has contracted sharply, falling by 18% in two years
(March 2009 to March 2011). This is in part explained by the need to reduce the size of the Irish
banking sector and move away from unsustainable loan-to-deposit ratios, as speciﬁed in the Financial
Measures Programme1:
The Central Bank has agreed with the External Partners that a sustainable Loan to
Deposit Ratio for the aggregate domestic banking system is 122.5%, meaning a surplus
of some e70bn of loans. Deleveraging these loans will reduce dependence on wholesale
funding and set the foundation for a sustainable banking sector.
In order to protect the domestic economy from the negative eﬀects of this deleveraging process, the
Programme emphasises that the deleveraging is to come from “‘non-core” assets, and not from “core
portfolios” which would continue “to service the retail, SME and corporate banking requirements
of the Irish economy.” In an eﬀort to ensure that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) would
continue to be able to access credit, an annual lending target of e3bn was established for the two
main banks as part of recapitalisation requirements. However, the Credit Review Oﬃce (CRO 2011)
says it will be a “challenge” for this target to be met. This paper uses ﬁrm level data to assess how
SMEs perceive current credit conditions and takes some tentative steps towards disentangling the
relative eﬀects of changes in supply versus demand.
We focus on SMEs for a number of reasons.2 SMEs account for a considerable proportion of
economic activity in most countries. Even prior to the current ﬁnancial crisis, the funding opportu-
nities and constraints of this type of ﬁrm had been of interest to economists and policy-makers. The
SME group accounts for the vast majority of enterprises in the EU and employs more than half of
the labour force. In Ireland, SMEs account for 99% of ﬁrms and employ 68% of workers (European
Commission, 2009b).
The SME sector makes up a signiﬁcant proportion of employment but, as a sector it is char-
acterised by a greater degree of output and proﬁt volatility than larger enterprises. They are also
more liable to failure; manufacturing ﬁrms with fewer than 20 employees have been found to be ﬁve
1Online version of report available at http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/industry-sectors/credit-
institutions/Documents/The%20Financial%20Measures%20Programme%20Report.pdf
2We follow the European Commission deﬁnitions of a small ﬁrm as one employing fewer than 50 employees
and a medium ﬁrm as having between 50 and 250 employees (European Commission, 2009a).
1times more likely to fail in a given year than larger ﬁrms (OECD, 2006). This is the case even in
times of stable economic growth. In times of recession or crisis, SMEs are particularly vulnerable
as their limited diversiﬁcation and dependence on short-term credit give them much less of a buﬀer
against demand falls than are available to larger ﬁrms (OECD, 2009). Furthermore, SMEs have
limited internal resources and little or no direct access to capital markets and they thus tend to rely
mainly on banks for funding. As a result, the fall in bank credit is likely to impact SMEs much more
directly than larger ﬁrms.
Given the previous reliance of Irish economic growth on Foreign Direct Investment and latterly
on property and construction, the development of a productive, innovative and internationalised
indigenous SME sector has become a key national policy objective. Central to the debate on the
growth of this sector has been the issue of access to ﬁnance. The importance of the issue is made
clear by Deputy John Perry, Minister of State at the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation
in a D´ ail debate on the SME sector on 19 July 20113:
The availability of credit to viable businesses is a recurring challenge that has hampered
new or expanding ﬁrms from developing new products and markets, and thereby pro-
tecting or creating jobs. This is a challenge the Government is determined to address.
To date, it has been diﬃcult to assess how the diﬃculties in the banking sector have been impacting
on SMEs. The available data on ﬁrms’ interactions with the credit market is limited, with even
the most comprehensive Irish ﬁrm-level datasets providing no information on ﬁrms’ ﬁnances or
borrowings. The debate on credit access has therefore been dominated by anecdotal evidence and
disagreement on whether the observed fall in aggregate credit is due to reduced demand from ﬁrms
or from banks restricting supply.
On the “reduced supply” side of the debate, a number of ad-hoc surveys have been carried
out showing impressions of tightened credit standards by banks. A survey of its members by the
Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants in Ireland (CPA), carried out in July 2011, reported that
87% believe banks are not “open for business”.4 In addition, 61% of CPA members gave their
opinion that viable businesses had been refused credit. Another survey by the Irish Small and
Medium Enterprises Association (ISME), found that of its members, 30% applied for credit in the
second quarter of 2011, and 54% of these were refused.5
On the other side of the debate, the Credit Review Oﬃce (CRO) and Banking Industry Fed-
eration maintain that banks are willing to lend, but that there has been a major fall in demand
3Transcript available here: http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2011/07/19/00008.asp
4Press release available at http://www.cpaireland.ie/displaycontent.aspx?groupid=367&headerid=1873
5Press release available at http://www.isme.ie/downloads/3008/11161bankwatchsurvey.doc
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since the recession began (see for example the CRO’s 5th Quarterly Report). A survey of banks in
Ireland, the Bank Lending Survey6, carried out by the Central Bank found reports of credit stan-
dards tightening between 2008 and 2010 and remaining unchanged since July 2010. This survey also
reported credit demand falling from 2008-10, and stabilising since late 2010.
Figures from surveys focusing on members of trade associations and lobby groups may not always
be representative of the experiences of the wider body of ﬁrms but, up until now, little information
from disinterested sources has been available. This paper presents analysis of two surveys of Irish
SMEs, both of which draw their samples from the whole relevant population and thus provides the
ﬁrst objective evidence on ﬁrms’ demand for credit and experience of supply decisions.
The ﬁrst survey is the Access to Finance survey carried out by the Central Statistics Oﬃce.
It collected information on the change in credit application and rejection rates for a representative
sample of Irish SMEs between 2007 and 2010. We ﬁnd a relatively small decrease in loan application
rates over the period. On supply, we ﬁrst compare the changes in the Irish ﬁgures over the period
to European countries in which an identical survey was carried out. This suggests that no other
country in Europe has seen as big a relative increase in loan rejection rates, and only Bulgaria has a
lower absolute rejection rate than Ireland in 2010. We then match the Irish data with quantitative
information from other CSO sources and use it to compare the characteristics of rejected and accepted
6http://www.centralbank.ie/mpolbo/mpolicy/Pages/lendingsurvey.aspx
3ﬁrms along a number of performance dimensions, such as productivity, sales, growth and the ﬁrm’s
relative position in their sector. This allows us to determine if there is evidence of sorting by quality
of the ﬁrms that successfully accessed credit in 2010. No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences could be
found between accepted and rejected ﬁrms on the basis of observable ﬁrm characteristics.
The second set of data is the Survey of Access to Finance in Europe (SAFE) which is a biannual
survey carried out by the European Central Bank across all Euro member states. Currently four
waves of the survey are available. We make use of this data to compare Irish ﬁrms to similar
Eurozone ﬁrms using matching techniques. This allows us to address the question of whether Irish
ﬁrms are diﬀerent from comparable Eurozone ﬁrms in terms of their changes in credit demand in
2009-10 and the degree to which they have been rationed credit. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in Ireland are
less likely to have decreased their demand for credit than comparable ﬁrms in the Euro area as a
whole or when compared to the peripheral crisis countries. Irish ﬁrms are also signiﬁcantly more
likely to have been refused credit than their counterparts elsewhere.
One variable for which we cannot control is the degree to which Irish SMEs are over-leveraged.
Given the extent of the credit and construction boom in Ireland up to 2007, it is eminently possible
that Irish SMEs have accumulated higher levels of debts that other European ﬁrms. On account of
this fact, it is prudent to interpret our estimates as upper bounds on the probability of rejection due
solely to the ﬁrm being Irish, with the potential that a certain proportion of the Irish coeﬃcient is
in fact explained by property-related over-leverage. One ﬁnding that mitigates this concern comes
from comparisons between Irish rejection rates and those of Baltic states which experienced similar
credit booms to Ireland in the past decade. These comparisons suggest that, even when considering
countries with a very similar previous economic pattern, Irish rejection rates appear to be high.
Additionally, an analysis of the reasons for rejection shows that one-ﬁfth of Irish SMEs were rejected
due to over-leverage, leaving four-ﬁfths of ﬁrms who were rejected for other reasons, including 15
percent who were rejected for no reason. The question of SME leverage in Ireland will require more
detailed ﬁrm-level data in order to be comprehensively addressed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some previous work on
SME credit constraints. Section 3 presents the evidence from the CSO Access to Finance survey
and Section 4 focuses on the SAFE results. Section 5 concludes.
2 SMEs and Credit Constraints: Background
Credit constraints have been deﬁned by the OECD (2006) as occurring when SMEs cannot obtain
ﬁnancing from banks, capital markets or other suppliers of ﬁnance even when they have the capability
4to use those funds productively. In a situation where economically viable projects may have to be
restricted or even abandoned because of funding diﬃculties, this has the potential to have serious
negative consequences for ongoing innovation and growth. It is this potential scenario that motivates
the concern for identifying and measuring whether SMEs are credit constrained and, if they are, if
there is any way that these constraints can be alleviated.
The greater diﬃculty of smaller ﬁrms in accessing credit relative to larger ﬁrms revolves around
diﬀerences in risk proﬁle and information asymmetries between the ﬁrm and lending institution
(OECD, 2006). It can be diﬃcult for SMEs to convince banks of the quality of their business
plans and, for newer ﬁrms in particular, it can take a considerable amount of eﬀort to build a
reputation that signals that they are low risk. From the bank’s point of view, the costs involved in
assessing and monitoring SMEs act as a disincentive to funding this market. For larger institutions,
transactions lending that relies on ﬁnancial statements of ﬁrms as an information source is often
preferred. Furthermore, SMEs often have less collateral that could protect creditors (ECB, 2007).
Banks may, in some circumstances, prefer to ration credit rather than use interest rate changes
to compensate for risk if there are concerns that this might result in adverse selection and hence a
riskier loan portfolio (OECD, 2006). The conceptual framework of Berger and Udell (2006) suggests,
however, that the above diﬃculties can be mitigated if banks use alternative transactions lending
technologies such as using credit scoring data, asset-based lending and factoring
Research on the funding of SMEs in Ireland has been relatively limited due primarily to a lack of
suﬃcient data. Ad hoc survey methods have been used to gain some information on the existence of
ﬁnancing constraints. Personal sources of ﬁnancing of the proprietor and external debt collateralised
by personal assets were found to be important sources of ﬁnance by Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2006)
in their survey of 275 small ﬁrms. This was particularly the case for younger ﬁrms, with retained
earnings becoming a more signiﬁcant source of funds for established ﬁrms. Most ﬁrms (86%) in
this sample reported that banks were willing to provide overdraft funding but no more detailed
information on credit constraints or loan turndown was collected.
Mazars (2009) published an independent report commissioned by the Government to examine
the availability of credit to SMEs in Ireland, in the face of widespread anecdotal reports that the
banking crisis was negatively impacting business credit. Of the ﬁrms surveyed for the report, 52%
reported that they were refused credit in the last 12 months. When queried about the reasons given
by banks in turning down loan applications, the ﬁrms reported that they were told there had been
“a change in bank lending policy” and “the sector in which the business operates is no longer a
sector to which the bank is prepared to lend”. The latter was particularly the case when the ﬁrm
operated in the real estate, construction and manufacturing sectors.
5This paper contributes to the literature on SME credit in Ireland both by utilising two new
data sources and by approaching the issue of credit demand and credit supply using separating
equilibrium t-tests and propensity score matching.
3 CSO Access to Finance Survey
3.1 Data Description
The Central Statistics Oﬃce carried out an Access to Finance survey covering Irish SMEs in 2010,
with the results released in May 2011 (CSO 2011). The total sample was 800 ﬁrms, drawn from
ﬁrms that had employed between 10 and 249 people in 2005 and continued to employ at least 10
people when the survey was carried out. The questionnaire related to ﬁrm activities in 2010 and
retrospective questions were asked about ﬁnancing in 2007. All of the ﬁrms were independent entities
(i.e. no subsidiaries were included on the assumption that ﬁnancing decisions would primarily be
taken in the group headquarters). The Access to Finance survey contains qualitative information
on the type of ﬁnance that the ﬁrm tried to obtain, the outcome of their application and their
impression on how ﬁnancing standards had changed.
The CSO assigns each ﬁrm an unique identifying number that enabled us to merge the results
of the Access to Finance survey with two other sources of data. Depending on their sector, the
ﬁrm ﬁnance information was matched to either the Census of Industrial Production or the Annual
Services Inquiry (see CSO 2008 and CSO 2009 for full descriptions of these surveys). Both of these
sources provide quantitative data on production, productivity, employment and international trade.
We were able to match 635 of the ﬁrms to one of these other surveys.7 The Census of Industrial
Production data used covered 2005 to 2009, while the Annual Services Inquiry covered 2005 to 2008.
Given that the ﬁrm information is therefore lagged either one or two years relative to the ﬁnancing
information, we will concentrate on broad measures of ﬁrm quality that are likely to be persistent.
There is an implicit assumption here that the shocks hitting the economy would have had symmetric
eﬀects on ﬁrms operating within the same sector (deﬁned at the NACE2 level).
A number of other caveats are worth noting before moving to the survey results. The ﬁrst is that
there is a “survivor bias” to be borne in mind, particularly when looking at the retrospective results,
as we cannot observe any ﬁrms that exited since 2007 and these may have been ﬁrms more likely
to have had diﬃculty accessing credit at that time. Thus our ﬁndings on credit supply for 2007 are
7The unmatched ﬁrms were primarily in either construction which is not included in either dataset or in
services as the Annual Services Inquiry does not provide a full census of ﬁrms with under 20 employees.
6likely to understate the true rejection rate. The second item to note is that when we observe a ﬁrm
that did not apply for any type of ﬁnance, we do not have any further information on the reasons
for not applying. Therefore, we are unable to distinguish between ﬁrms that had suﬃcient internal
resources and did not need any external ﬁnancing from those that did not apply because they felt
that an application was bound to be rejected. There is also no separation of questions relating
to new loans from those restructuring existing credit arrangements, so we cannot tell if these are
being treated diﬀerently by the banks. As mentioned in the Introduction, we cannot identify ﬁrms’
leverage in the data. Therefore, over-indebtedness as a factor explaining rejection is not included in
our T-tests.
3.2 Summary of Credit Demand and Supply
Out of the total sample, approximately 200 ﬁrms applied for loan ﬁnancing in each of the two years
referred to in the survey. In 2007, 37.2% of ﬁrms applied for loan ﬁnance and in 2010 this had fallen to
30.7%. This shows a reasonably signiﬁcant reduction in the demand for credit, but given the extent
of the fall in economic activity between 2007 and 2010, it does not suggest that credit demand has
“fallen oﬀ a cliﬀ”. Unfortunately, as we pointed out in the previous subsection, we cannot tell how
much of this reduction might be due to discouraged borrowers relative to the reduction coming from
a drop in investment opportunities. However, if there was a widespread perception amongst ﬁrms
that credit was being restricted, one might have expected a larger reduction in credit applications.
Turning to credit supply, Table 1 shows the breakdown of the outcome of applications for bank
credit in both 2007 and 2010. The survey allows ﬁrms to indicate if they had been successful,
unsuccessful or if the application had been “partially” successful.8 As we can see, the level of
unsuccessful applications in 2007 is close to negligible, with under 2% rejected and only a further 3%
granted less credit than they had applied for. The change in the percentage of successful applications
fell from slightly over 95% in 2007 to just under 57% in 2010. The rejection rate increased to almost
a quarter, while a further 19% of ﬁrms were partially successful in their applications.
Table 2 broadens the deﬁnition of ﬁnancing from bank loans to also include other oﬃcial ﬁnancing
sources such as overdrafts and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. The success rate for these wider
ﬁnancing options was higher than for bank loans alone, with over 67% of ﬁrms accessing some type
of credit. However, this still contrasts strongly with the 96% success rate in 2007. These ﬁgures
can be benchmarked against European comparator countries, as the Access to Finance survey was
8No further questions are asked about the extent of the “partial” success in terms of the percentage of
credit applied for that was actually granted.
7Table 1: Access to Bank Loans
Unsuccessful Partial Successful
No. % No. % No. % Total
2007 4 1.96 6 2.94 194 95.10 204
2010 44 24.72 33 18.54 101 56.74 178
Table 2: Access to All Loan Sources
Unsuccessful Partial Successful
No. % No. % No. % Total
2007 2 0.83 8 3.33 230 95.83 240
2010 36 16.67 35 16.20 145 67.13 216
carried out as part of a wider European Commission study. Tables 22 and 23 give the results for the
same study carried out in twenty European countries. Table 22 shows that Ireland had the second
highest acceptance rate in Europe in 2007, which one might argue was certainly overly proﬂigate.
However, Table 23 shows that, relative to European comparator countries, Irish SMEs appear to
be experiencing particular diﬃculties in accessing ﬁnancing in 2010. As Table 24 makes apparent,
no other country has seen a similar fall in its position on the acceptance rate ranking, with Ireland
falling from the 2nd highest to 19th highest acceptance rate, which points to an over-correction
relative to 2007 lending levels. Looking at pure rejection rates, i.e. considering “partially accepted”
ﬁrms as part of the “accepted” category, does not alter this picture. Looking at further international
comparable data sources, a survey of ﬁrm bank applications carried out in Latvia, Estonia, Hungary
and the Czech Republic showed similarly high acceptance rates in 2005 to those we ﬁnd in the 2007
results for Ireland. Loan rejection rates increased signiﬁcantly when the survey was repeated in 2009,
with rates that ranged from 7% in Hungary to 21% in Latvia.9 Even this most extreme contraction
in Eastern Europe does not match the increase in Irish rejection rates recorded in Tables 22 to 24.
9Authors’ calcuations using World Bank/European Bank for Reconstruction and Development survey
data, details available on request. See appendix, Table 25 and 26 for summary statistics on the Baltic and
UK results.
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UK evidence also shows a sharp increase in rejection rates in SME applications for credit from 6.1%
in 2001-04 to 16.3% in 2008, but even for the riskiest group of ﬁrms the rejection rates do not reach
Irish levels (Frazer, 2010). Of importance here is that the Baltic States and the UK are comparable
to Ireland in that there were large credit and construction booms in all these countries in the past
decade. The fact that Ireland has higher rejection rates than any of these countries helps alleviate
concerns that our extreme ﬁndings for Ireland are purely explained by property-related over-leverage
of Irish SMEs.
One could claim that a large fall in Irish SME credit acceptance rates is to be expected, given
the signiﬁcant fall in output experienced since the onset of the economic crisis in 2007. We address
this issue in Figure 2 by plotting a linear ﬁt of changes in loan acceptance rates on changes in output
for each country reported in Table 22 and 23. This plot shows a positive relationship, with larger
contractions in output associated with larger declines in the acceptance rate. Importantly from the
point of view of our analysis, Ireland is found signiﬁcantly below the ﬁtted line, indicating that
the decline in credit acceptance rates is larger than that expected given the decline in output. For
robustness, Figure 3 in the Appendix plots a similar relationship, looking at the pure rejection rate
rather than the pure acceptance rate. The picture does not change, with Ireland now lying above
the ﬁtted line in this case, indicating that this ﬁnding is robust to the category in which partially
accepted ﬁrms are placed.
Looking at a breakdown by broad sector in Table 3, we do not observe any major diﬀerence
between manufacturing and services. Both sectors show a success rate close to two-thirds for appli-
9Table 3: Finance by Broad Sector
Manufacturing % Services %
Unsuccessful 8 19.51 21 15.33
Partial 5 12.20 27 19.71
Successful 28 68.29 89 64.96
Total 41 100.00 137 100.00
cations for our broader deﬁnition of ﬁnancing in 2010.
3.3 Testing Credit Allocation
We have seen that there was a sharp increase in rejection rates, particularly for bank loans, during
the recession. However, this alone is not suﬃcient evidence of a credit crunch. The OECD deﬁnition
of credit constraints in Section 2 included an important proviso that it applied to ﬁrms that have the
capability to use those funds productively. Given the extent of the fall in economic activity between
2007 and 2010, a reduction in credit could be a reﬂection of a lack of investment opportunities that
banks feel have a reasonable probability of success. If this is the case, the rejections could be largely
a function of an increased risk proﬁle and the refusals entirely prudent.
It is diﬃcult to gauge empirically the strength of this argument. There are many ﬁrm char-
acteristics that are unobservable in the data and extremely limited information on the purpose for
which ﬁnancing is sought. That said, the question of how credit is being allocated to SMEs is of
such importance that every attempt to shed light on the process should be examined, even if the
data cannot address all facets of the issue.
While it is impossible to quantitatively model all factors that should inﬂuence a bank’s lending
decision, we can make inferences from tests of the data available to us. We take as our working
hypothesis that if the banking sector is “correctly” allocating credit, we should see a performance gap
between rejected and accepted ﬁrms. On the other hand, if credit is being rationed in a “blanket”
fashion, then rejected and accepted ﬁrms will not appear to be any diﬀerent from one another.
In order to do this, we pool the data into two groups:
• Firms fully successful in obtaining ﬁnance.
• Firms partially successful or unsuccessful.
10We then perform T-tests to examine if the means are the same across these two groups for a number
of measures of ﬁrm performance. The ﬁrst measures that we look at are labour productivity, labour
productivity as a percentage of the frontier (most productive) ﬁrm in a sector, sales and sales
growth. To deﬁne the frontier ﬁrm in the two relative measures, we make use of the full coverage
of the Census of Industrial Production and Annual Services Inquiry for each sector at the NACE2
level. Assuming that the economic shocks of the past few years were symmetric within each narrow
sector, each ﬁrm’s position relative to the frontier should be reasonably stable over time. Table 4
Table 4: Productivity and Growth by Loan Outcome
Unsuccessful Successful p-value N
/Partial
Labour Productivity 2008 11.76 11.71 0.67 178
LP % of Frontier, 2008 0.73 0.74 0.71 178
log Sales, 2008 8.26 8.31 0.80 178
Sales growth 2008 0.0002 0.0328 0.48 123
presents T-tests comparing the means of successful and unsuccessful applicants for ﬁnance for each
performance measure. The hypothesis being tested is that the means are equal between rejected
and accepted ﬁrms.
For all four of the indicators of ﬁrm quality, we ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
ﬁrms that were successful and those that were unsuccessful in their credit applications. In terms of
labour productivity, they actually appear to perform worse than those ﬁrms that are unsuccessful or
partially successful, while in terms of distance to frontier, they appear only marginally stronger (in
no case is a result statistically signiﬁcant). We also look at sales growth as a proxy for the growth
potential of the ﬁrm, which is something that a lender is expected to take account of when deciding
on capital allocation. We see that the successful ﬁrms in 2010 do appear to have been growing at a
faster rate in 2007-08 than those who did not obtain their desired ﬁnancing. This diﬀerence however
is a long way from being statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that there is little sorting by quality
taking place, at least not on the basis of these measures of past ﬁrm performance. For roubstness,
the tests of Table 4 were replicated, redeﬁning the “successful” category to include both those ﬁrms
that were fully or partially unsuccesful. Table 21 again ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between accepted and rejected ﬁrms.
Research in the ﬁeld of international trade has consistently shown that exporters perform better
11than non-exporters along a wide range of ﬁrm characteristics. We therefore examine the composition
of the 2010 loan ﬁnance success rate by ﬁrms’ exporter status. As above, the working hypothesis is
that if the banks are correctly allocating capital according to risk, exporters should be more successful
in obtaining loans than their counterparts serving only the domestic Irish market. Echoing our
ﬁndings using productivity measures, we see in Table 5 that there appears to be no discrimination
on ﬁrm “quality” - exporters are just as likely as non-exporters to be unsuccessful in their applications
for loan ﬁnance in 2010. Both exporters and non-exporters have a rate of rejection of 16%, with
almost identical rates for partial and successful applications as well. Table 6 presents an alternative
Table 5: Export Status and Loan Outcome
Non-Exporter % Exporter %
Unsuccessful 23 16.31 6 16.22
Partial 26 18.44 6 16.22
Successful 92 65.25 25 67.57
Total 141 100.00 37 100.00
measure by examining the breakdown of the access to ﬁnance variable according to the quartile in
which the ﬁrm resides in its NACE 2 industry’s labour productivity distribution in 2008. We again
see that, for each quartile, the rates of acceptance are roughly similar. The ﬁrms that are most
productive in their sector are more likely to be partially accepted for a loan, but are in fact less
likely than other ﬁrms to be fully successful.
Table 6: Productivity Distribution and Loan Outcome
Quartile of ﬁrm’s NACE2 Labour Productivity in 2008
1st % 2nd % 3rd % 4th %
Unsuccessful 4 17.39 10 20.41 8 17.39 7 13.73
Partial 4 17.39 6 12.24 8 17.39 13 25.49
Successful 15 65.22 33 67.35 30 65.22 31 60.78
Total 23 100 49 100 46 100 51 100
123.4 The reasons for rejection
For those ﬁrms rejected for bank loans in 2010, the survey asks which (if any) reasons were given
by the bank for the rejection decision. Table 7 reports that too much debt already accumulated
by the SME was the most common reason for rejection in Ireland, and that Ireland was among
the countries where this reason was most prevalent. This over-leverage of Irish SMEs is potentially
linked to over-investment in property during the construction boom up to 2007, although data do
not allow us to identify the breakdown of over-leveraged ﬁrms between property and other types
of credit. The problem of debt overhang has been identiﬁed by many commentators10 as the key
barrier to recovery from the current economic crisis. In light of such proclamations, the ﬁgures for
over-leverage appear worrying in the Irish context.
After over-leverage, the next most common reason for rejection in Ireland was “no reason”, with
Ireland having the highest share of ﬁrms in this category. That the share of ﬁrms rejected for no
reason was higher than that for insuﬃcient collateral, a poor credit rating or risky potential of the
borrower points to a signiﬁcant degree of credit rationing in the Irish SME market.
3.5 How big a problem is credit?
The evidence from the CSO survey shows a fairly dramatic decline in the success rate for SME loan
applications between 2007 and 2010. How big a problem is this for the ﬁrms? The survey asks
ﬁrms to pick the ﬁve factors that are most likely to limit their growth between now and 2013. Table
8 reports results for the most frequently identiﬁed factors. Unsurprisingly, the general economic
outlook is mentioned by almost all respondents. Perhaps more surprisingly, ﬁnance is picked as a
growth-limiting factor by just a quarter of ﬁrms. A number of other constraints were chosen as more
important than ﬁnance access, with 60% of ﬁrms reporting price competition/tight margins as an
obstacle, 53% reporting domestic demand and 50% reporting labour costs.
We look at how the question on ﬁnance as a future obstacle is broken down among our ﬁrms
that applied for a loan in 2010. Not surprisingly, Table 9 tells us that among unsuccessful ﬁrms in
2010, 75% believe ﬁnancing will be an obstacle to growth between now and 2013. Among partially
successful ﬁrms, this ﬁgure falls to 43%, while among ﬁrms who were successful in 2010, 72% do not
believe ﬁnance will be an obstacle to growth. Notice that this sample is of 216, rather than the 635
in Table 8, as only 216 ﬁrms applied for external ﬁnance in 2010.
10See e.g. Rogoﬀ (2011) for a discussion of the eﬀects of over-leveraged balance sheets of households,
governments and ﬁrms on the potential for economic recovery.
13Table 7: Reasons given by bank for rejecting loan application. Countries with acceptance
rates greater than 80% are excluded.
Over- No reason Insuﬃcient Poor Credit Risky
Leverage Collateral Rating Potential
Bulgaria 2.7 13.5 8.5 3.3 4.9
Denmark 5.7 4.5 12.5 0.2 1.8
Germany 6.2 9.4 13.4 13.6 5.2
Ireland 19.4 15.9 12.0 2.6 5.8
Greece 9.4 13.0 9.9 10.4 4.7
Spain 12.4 9.8 12.7 11.8 2.8
Italy 4.3 4.1 3.6 6.2 1.7
Cyprus 27.2 10.3 15.5 3.7 7.8
Latvia 18.4 8.5 9.5 0.1 4.9
Lithuania 8.7 10.6 11.0 12.5 5.2
Luxembourg 4.5 6.9 10.2 7.7 5.3
Netherlands 4.6 4.3 7.3 5.8 5.8
Slovakia 5.9 7.4 6.9 14.0 4.5
Sweden 8.9 6.4 6.9 6.6 6.6
UK 5.2 8.0 13.8 5.9 7.2
Table 8: Perceived Obstacles to Growth
Yes No
Price Competition 60.3 29.7
Regulation 33.3 66.7
Finance 25.2 74.8
Market Competition 47.2 52.8
Wage Costs 50.2 49.8
Domestic Demand 52.8 47.2
General Economy 89.8 11.2
3.6 Summary of ﬁndings: CSO’s Access to Finance Survey
The Access to Finance survey carried out by the CSO measured changes in the SME credit market
between 2007 and 2010. It showed a decline in credit demand, with the percentage of ﬁrms applying
14Table 9: Perceived Finance Obstacle and Loan Experience
No Problem % Problem % Total
Unsuccessful 9 25 27 75 36
Partial 20 57.14 15 42.85 35
Successful 104 71.72 41 28.27 145
Total 133 61.57 83 38.42 216
for a bank loan falling from 37.2% in 2007 to 30.7% in 2010. The change in demand was fairly
modest however when compared with the sharp fall in approval rates for those ﬁrms that did apply.
We observe rejection rates up from 5% in 2007 to 43% in 2010 for bank loans and rejection rates of
33% for all credit. Using comparable data, we observe almost no other country in the EU that has
undergone a similar increase in loan rejection rates for SMEs.
We then examined if there was any evidence of sorting on ﬁrm quality between rejected and
accepted ﬁrms. Using a range of measures of past ﬁrm performance and position relative to others
in their sector, we could ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of ﬁrms that could
explain the diﬀering experiences with credit providers.
Despite the contraction in credit availability, access to ﬁnance is considered an important im-
pediment to future growth by a surprisingly small share of Irish SMEs. Broader concerns about the
economic climate, cost levels and the intensity of competition were all regarded as barriers to future
growth by a majority of ﬁrms, whereas ﬁnance was a key concern to approximately a quarter of
survey respondents.
4 The ECB survey ”Access to ﬁnance of small and medium-
sized enterprises” (SAFE)
4.1 The Data
Since 2009, the ECB has conducted four half-yearly waves of the SAFE survey of Eurozone-area
SMEs. The aim of the survey is to provide information on the ﬁnancing needs of SMEs, their
experience in attempting to access ﬁnance, along with information on their perceptions of current
economic and ﬁnancial conditions. The survey also asks ﬁrms to place their turnover, employment,
15ownership type, age and sector of activity into categories. As one can see from Table 10, the
majority of the sample comes from four countries: Germany, Spain, France and Italy, for whom
the sample of ﬁrms is representative. The overall sample for all countries is also representative of
Eurozone SMEs, but for individual countries apart from those already mentioned, the samples are
not representative.11
Table 10: Breakdown of SAFE survey sample size by survey round and country.
H1 2009 H2 2009 H1 2010 H2 2010 Total
Austria 224 203 200 500 1,127
Belgium 220 202 203 517 1,142
Germany 1,003 1,001 1,000 1,000 4,004
Spain 1,012 1,004 1,000 1,000 4,016
Finland 111 100 100 500 811
France 1,000 1,001 1,003 1,004 4,008
Greece 220 200 200 500 1,120
Ireland 110 101 100 500 811
Italy 1,006 1,004 1,000 1,000 4,010
Netherlands 323 252 256 502 1,333
Portugal 327 252 250 509 1,338
Total 5,556 5,320 5,312 7,532 23,720
Given the small sample size of Irish SMEs and the lack of representativeness of the sample,
comparisons of Irish survey responses to the SAFE survey across time are of little value. The authors
of the survey state that “the sample size in the other countries is too small to permit robust analysis
in each country separately”. We focus instead on cross-country comparisons in which Irish ﬁrms
are benchmarked against ﬁrms in comparator Eurozone countries using Propensity Score Matching
(PSM, explained in Section 4.2). The SAFE data allow us to compare both supply and demand of
SME credit in Ireland to Eurozone benchmarks. The aim of the empirical exercise on the supply
side is to ascertain to what extent Irish ﬁrms are being refused credit, relative to similar ﬁrms in
11The sample was stratiﬁed by ﬁrm size class, economic activity and country.
16comparable countries. On the demand side, we estimate the diﬀerence in the likelihood of credit
demand having changed in the previous six-month period for an Irish ﬁrm relative to a comparable
Eurozone ﬁrm. While the results of these models do not tell us anything about the absolute levels
of credit demand or credit supply in the Irish SME sector, they do give us a sense of the diﬀering
nature of the Irish credit market relative to comparable benchmark countries. Table 11 gives the
breakdown of the following question in the survey, referring to bank credit:
If you applied and tried to negotiate for this type of ﬁnancing over the past 6 months,
did you: receive all the ﬁnancing you requested; receive only part of the ﬁnancing you
requested; refuse to proceed because of unacceptable costs or terms and conditions; or
have you not received anything at all?
We code as “Rejected” all ﬁrms who received only part of the requested ﬁnancing, refused to proceed
or received nothing at all. Only ﬁrms that received all requested ﬁnancing are coded as “Not
Rejected”. This is our measure of credit supply that will be used in Section 4.2. Although we
cannot say anything conclusive about these breakdowns for countries other than France, Germany,
Italy and Spain, the rejection rates in Table 11 do suggest that Spanish, Irish and Greek SME credit
markets have been particularly parsimonious in their allocation of credit to SMEs over 2009 and
2010. One is justiﬁed in being sceptical of any normative judgement on the rationing of credit in
individual countries from this table. It is eminently possible that rejection rates in Ireland, Greece
and Spain could be explained by increased riskiness of ﬁrms in these countries, in which case the
banking sector would be deemed to be making credit decisions in a perfectly rational way. Our
analysis in Section 4.3 will address this issue.
We also observe ﬁrms’ responses on their demand for bank loans. Table 12 gives country-level
frequencies for the following survey question with reference to bank loans:
For each of the following types of external ﬁnancing, please tell me if your needs in-
creased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 months
From Table 12, it does not appear that credit demand among Irish ﬁrms has been changing in
any systematically diﬀerent way to other Eurozone countries. The share of SMEs with increased,
unchanged and decreased demand for bank loans, standing at 19.3, 60.8 and 19.9 percent respectively,
match the total sample shares very closely. As with Table 11, we will get behind these ﬁgures in
Section 4.3 by using PSM to compare each Irish ﬁrm to the most similar comparator ﬁrm from the
rest of the sample.
From our description of the credit supply and demand variables in this section, the initial
suggestion coming from the data is that supply conditions have been very restrictive in Ireland
17Table 11: Breakdown of the credit supply variable by country. Bank loans only.
Not rejected Rejected Total
Country No. % No. % No. %
Austria 206 80.2 51 19.8 257 100
Belgium 212 81.5 48 18.5 260 100
Germany 683 74.6 233 25.4 916 100
Spain 714 50.6 696 49.4 1,410 100
Finland 92 84.4 17 15.6 109 100
France 901 81.4 206 18.6 1,107 100
Greece 169 47.7 185 52.3 354 100
Ireland 54 44.3 68 55.7 122 100
Italy 896 67.8 426 32.2 1,322 100
Netherlands 89 53.6 77 46.4 166 100
Portugal 173 61.8 107 38.2 280 100
Total 4,189 66.5 2,114 33.5 6,303 100
18Table 12: Change in ﬁrms’ demand for bank loans in previous six months.
Increased Unchanged Decreased Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Austria 160 20.4 467 59.4 159 20.2 786 100
Belgium 159 18 570 64.7 152 17.3 881 100
Germany 604 21.3 1,656 58.5 572 20.2 2,832 100
Spain 815 24.9 1,822 55.8 630 19.3 3,267 100
Finland 108 17.8 367 60.4 133 21.9 608 100
France 646 17.9 2,426 67.4 527 14.6 3,599 100
Greece 239 29.7 414 51.4 152 18.9 805 100
Ireland 130 19.3 409 60.8 134 19.9 673 100
Italy 802 24.4 1,950 59.4 531 16.2 3,283 100
Netherlands 185 20.4 509 56.1 214 23.6 908 100
Portugal 193 22 521 59.3 164 18.7 878 100
Total 4,041 21.8 11,111 60 3,368 18.2 18,520 100
19relative to the Eurozone as a whole, and relative to all countries apart from Spain and Greece. On
the demand side, the data do not oﬀer any suggestion that credit demand has been falling more in
Ireland than in other Eurozone countries. Section 4.2 will present the theory behind the Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) methodology that we will use in Section 4.3 to test whether diﬀerences in
credit supply and demand persist once we have matched Irish ﬁrms to comparator ﬁrms in other
countries.
4.2 Propensity Score Matching
PSM was traditionally used in microeconometric studies of labour, education and health economics,
with its use expanding to a broader range of topics in recent years. The broad aim of the methodology
is to isolate the causal eﬀect of a given treatment (often a policy change), by matching individuals in a
treatment group (T) with individuals in a control group (C) along a set of observable characteristics.
This is necessary mainly where individuals have not been randomly assigned into the states T or C.
The key Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) of PSM is that, once observations have been
matched on observables, the only factor driving any diﬀerence in the outcome variable of interest
between T and C is the treatment itself. While clearly inferior to randomly assigning a policy
intervention to one sample and depriving another sample of the same treatment and observing
the diﬀerence in outcomes (a purely experimental approach), PSM oﬀers a powerful observational
alternative, once the CIA can be credibly posited to hold.
Mathematically, we can represent our treatment dummy Di = 1 if treatment occurs and Di = 0
if the individual i does not receive the treatment, i.e. is in the control group. Our outcome variable
of interest (say the probability of being rejected for a loan), when individual i receives the treatment,
is represented by Y1i. The inherent problem in all observational studies is that the counterfactual
Y0i (the value of the outcome variable for individual i when treatment is not received), is never
observed for the same i,Di = 1. The role of PSM is to estimate the causal eﬀect of the treatment
(Y1i − Y0i). This eﬀect is known as the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT). PSM
begins by estimating a propensity score, ﬁrst introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). From
the pool of treated and non-treated individuals i, with the vector of observable characteristics X,
the propensity score is the probability that an individual i is in the treatment group:
pi(x) = Pr(D = 1|X = x) (1)
Equation 1 is generally estimated by a probit regression. There are a number of ways by
which PSM can proceed after the estimation of (1). Nearest neighbour matching will match an
individual in the treatment group with the individual with the closest pi(x) in the non-treated
20group. Other methods, such as nearest-multiple-neighbours matching and Kernel matching, will
match a treatment ﬁrm to a number of control ﬁrms, weighting the control ﬁrms by the diﬀerence
between their propensity score and that of the treatment ﬁrm.
Once treatment i have been matched using one of the methods above, the Average Treatment
Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT) is calculated as the weighted average of the diﬀerence in Yi between
treated and matched control i. Once the CIA is deemed to hold, this ATT is interpreted as the
estimated causal eﬀect of the treatment D on the outcome Y .
There are a number of ways to provide support for the CIA when using PSM. Most importantly,
the researcher must test whether there are diﬀerences between T and C in the set of observables X
used to calculate Pi(x). In order for the CIA to hold, we must ﬁrst be sure that, post-matching,
xt = xc for all x, i.e. the mean values of each observable characteristic should not be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the treatment and control groups. Further, one can observe the distribution of
the propensity score in T and C post-matching. For a match to have been eﬀective, the propensity
score should be similarly distributed across the two groups. PSM should also only be estimated for
observations deemed to be “on common support”, which means that only observations that have a
propensity score in the region of overlap between the treated and non-treated groups’ distributions
should be used. When common support does not hold for some observations, researchers must be
more careful in their interpretation of the ATT, which now becomes the Average Treatment Eﬀect on
the Treated who are on support. This poses particular concerns when the observations oﬀ-support
have not randomly ended up in this state. In all results presented in the next section, all observations
were in fact “on support”, meaning that this issue did not pose problems to our methodology.
Section 4.3 covers our implementation of PSM vis-a-vis the issue of Irish SME credit demand
and supply.
4.3 Results on Credit Supply
We use PSM not to estimate the eﬀect of any particular policy change, but rather to look at the
eﬀect of a ﬁrm being Irish, controlling for observable characteristics of the ﬁrm, on credit supply
and demand. On supply, this removes the eﬀect that the riskiness of applicant ﬁrms has on credit
decisions; assuming the CIA holds, the estimated eﬀect is due solely to the nature of the Irish credit
market. Similarly, when looking at credit demand, we attempt to quantify the diﬀerence in demand
changes between Irish and comparable Eurozone countries not explained by ﬁrm characteristics.
We begin reporting results on credit supply. Our pool of ﬁrms is initially all ﬁrms in the
sample. In the terminology of PSM, being an Irish ﬁrm is the treatment, T, and being from any
21other country is the non-treatment, or control, C. We estimate equation 1, where X comprises the
following variables:
• Categorical variables for turnover, employment, independence, sector of activity, age, owner-
ship.
• Variables indicating whether the following increased, decreased or remained unchanged in
the previous six months: Turnover, labour costs, other costs, net interest expenses, proﬁt,
mark-ups.
• Variables indicating ﬁrms’ perception of changes in the following: general economic outlook,
access to public ﬁnancial support, ﬁrm-speciﬁc outlook, ﬁrm’s capital, ﬁrm’s credit history.
• Dummy indicating survey wave.
In Table 13, we ﬁrst report results where the pool of non-treated ﬁrms come from all sample
countries apart from Ireland. Here we see that, depending on the matching method used (one nearest
neighbour, two neighbours, four neighbours or kernel matching12), we ﬁnd an Average Treatment
Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT) that lies between 15 and 18 percent. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the
1% level for all cases apart from single-neighbour matching, where it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The interpretation of the coeﬃcient is that a ﬁrm in Ireland has a 15 to 18 percent higher likelihood
of being rejected when applying for a bank loan than a ﬁrm in another Eurozone country, and that
this eﬀect is not explained by ﬁrm-level characteristics and is rather due simply to the ﬁrm being in
Ireland.
Table 13: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm rejected for a bank loan in
previous six months. Non-treated group: All sampled Eurozone ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
.1471 2.05 102 4,538 .1341 n(1)
.1666 2.72 102 4,538 .1341 n(2)
.1568 2.78 102 4,538 .1341 n(4)
.1837 3.64 102 4,538 .1341 Kernel
We extend this exercise by comparing Irish ﬁrms to two subsets of the data. First we look only
at countries in which a similar sovereign, economic and/or banking crisis has been felt since the onset
of the global economic crisis. Intuitively, one would expect that the Irish banking system should not
12n(x) implies nearest neighbour matching with x neighbours.
22be rationing credit to a much larger degree than this set of countries, given that the eﬀect of ﬁrms’
characteristics is already controlled for by the methodology, and expectations in these countries
regarding economic growth should not be signiﬁcantly more optimistic. However, when looking at
Irish ﬁrms compared to Greek, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese ﬁrms in Table 14, we still ﬁnd a
coeﬃcient that ranges between 11 and 15 percent and is always signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 14: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm rejected for a bank loan in
previous six months. Non-treated group: Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
.1471 2.06 102 2,494 .1315 n(1)
.1372 2.21 102 2,494 .1315 n(2)
.1127 1.97 102 2,494 .1315 n(4)
.1119 2.17 102 2,494 .1315 Kernel
We ﬁnally compare Irish ﬁrms’ credit supply with ﬁrms in countries other than the four crisis
countries studied in Table 14. The results from this sample will give us a comparison with countries
which are closer to a “normal” stable equilibrium in their ﬁnancial sector. The results in Table 15
reveal that when compared to these countries, Irish ﬁrms appear to be 26 to 30 percent more likely
to be rejected for a loan.
Table 15: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm rejected for a bank loan in previous
six months. Non-treated group: All ﬁrms apart from Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese
ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
.2941 3.94 102 2,004 .2405 n(1)
.2549 3.89 102 2,004 .2405 n(2)
.2647 4.39 102 2,004 .2405 n(4)
.2731 4.96 102 2,004 .2405 Kernel
Table 11 showed that Irish ﬁrms appeared to be getting rejected more often than ﬁrms in other
Eurozone countries when applying for bank loans. The results of Tables 13, 14 and 15 indicate that
this cannot simply be explained by the composition of ﬁrms applying for loan ﬁnancing. When
matching Irish ﬁrms to comparable ﬁrms across the Eurozone, we see that there seems to be a large
23eﬀect unexplained by the characteristics of applying ﬁrms. This eﬀect, explained solely by the fact
that the ﬁrm is Irish, is interpreted as evidence of signiﬁcant credit rationing on behalf of the Irish
banking sector relative to other European countries.
We can test the robustness of the results to deﬁnitions of what it means to be “rejected” for
a loan. Firstly, we redeﬁne “successful” ﬁrms to also include ﬁrms that receive a portion of the
amount of ﬁnancing they requested. We replicate the PSM model with the same observables as
the previous three tables. Table 16 reports results for the three separate samples of the previous
three tables, reporting only the results of four-nearest-neighbours matching. When comparing Irish
ﬁrms to all ﬁrms, and to PIIGS only ﬁrms, we see similar coeﬃcients to the more strict deﬁnition of
rejection applied above, with ATT of 15 and 12 per cent respectively. When comparing Irish ﬁrms
to all non-PIIGS ﬁrms, however, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of being Irish on rejection falls from 26-30
percent to 17 percent.
Table 16: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm rejected for a bank loan in
previous six months. “Successful” ﬁrms redeﬁned to include ﬁrms receiving part of the
requested amount.
Non-treateed ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
All ﬁrms .1519 3.09 102 4,538 .1342 n(4)
PIIGS .1201 2.38 102 2,494 .1315 n(4)
All non-PIIGS .1667 3.20 102 2,004 .2405 n(4)
In the last two survey rounds (H1 and H2 2010), ﬁrms were asked to be more speciﬁc when
referring to partial success in their loan applications. We redeﬁne “successful” ﬁrms as those receiving
75 percent or more of their requested amount, and keep those receiving less than 75 percent in the
“rejected” sample. We then repeat the exercise as in Table 16 with results reported in Table 17. We
now see that with this more precise deﬁnition of rejected ﬁrms, albeit for a slightly smaller sample,
that the baseline results seem to hold, with Irish ﬁrms 29 percent more likely than comparable
non-PIIGS countries to have been rejected for a loan by our new deﬁnition.
4.4 Credit Demand
Many commentators claim that a fall-oﬀ in credit demand is the reason behind the decrease in credit
provided to the Irish SME sector. As mentioned in the introduction, little can be said about the
absolute changes in credit demand among Irish SMEs using the SAFE survey. We can however use
24Table 17: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm rejected for a bank loan in
previous six months. “Successful” ﬁrms redeﬁned to include ﬁrms receiving more than 75%
of requested amount.
Non-treateed ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
All ﬁrms .1752 3.14 97 4,125 .1379 n(4)
PIIGS .1186 2.08 97 2,173 .1321 n(4)
All non-PIIGS .2989 4.22 97 1,952 .2463 n(4)
a similar set of PSM models to examine whether Irish ﬁrms’ credit demand has been falling more
than similar European ﬁrms over 2009-10. The set of observable characteristics used to calculate the
propensity score is identical to that listed above for the bank loan rejection models. The outcome
variable is now a dummy taking a 1 if a ﬁrm’s loan demand fell in the previous six months, and
taking a 0 if demand remained unchanged or increased.
The results of Tables 18 to 20 suggest that, if anything, Irish ﬁrms appear to be 5 to 7 percent
less likely to have decreased their demand for credit than similar ﬁrms in the Eurozone. The results
are signiﬁcant when comparing Irish ﬁrms to the whole sample and to the sample of crisis countries,
but not when looking at non-crisis countries only. At all points, the sign on our outcome variable
is negative, indicating that over 2009 and 2010 we cannot ﬁnd any evidence of a fall in Irish SME
credit demand relative to similar ﬁrms in the Eurozone.
Table 18: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm’s demand for bank loans decreased
in previous six months. Non-treated group: All sampled Eurozone ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
-.0561 -2.00 517 12,644 .1798 n(1)
-.0591 -2.43 517 12,644 .1798 n(2)
-.0483 -2.19 517 12,644 .1798 n(4)
-.0407 -2.11 517 12,644 .1798 Kernel
25Table 19: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm’s demand for bank loans decreased
in previous six months. Non-treated group: Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
-.0735 -2.51 517 5,907 .1768 n(1)
-.0677 -2.69 517 5,907 .1768 n(2)
-.0508 -2.21 517 5,907 .1768 n(4)
-.0503 -2.46 517 5,907 .1768 Kernel
Table 20: PSM results. Outcome variable: Di = 1 if ﬁrm’s demand for bank loans decreased
in previous six months. Non-treated group: All ﬁrms apart from Greek, Italian, Spanish,
Portuguese ﬁrms.
ATT t-stat NT NC Pseudo R2 Method
-.0522 -1.68 517 6,737 .2679 n(1)
-.0416 -1.52 517 6,737 .2679 n(2)
-.0328 -1.31 517 6,737 .2679 n(4)
-.0264 -1.18 517 6,737 .2679 Kernel
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the issue of credit access to SMEs in Ireland since the onset of the global
economic crisis. The aim is to provide an objective set of conclusions on movements in demand and
supply of Irish SME credit. In doing so we have exploited two data sources: the CSO’s Access to
Finance survey and the European Central Bank’s SAFE survey.
Using the CSO survey, we have found a mild drop-oﬀ in credit demand among Irish SMEs,
coupled with a substantial drop in credit supply, measured by rejection rates of ﬁrms applying for
ﬁnancing. The increase in loan rejection rates appears unparalleled in any EU country apart from
Bulgaria, and is higher than rejection rates to high-risk ﬁrms in the UK in 2008 and rejection rates in
crisis-stricken Baltic states in 2009. We use ﬁrm-level production data from the CSO to test whether
this contraction in credit supply might be deemed a “rational allocation” of credit, in that there is a
separating rather than a pooling equilibrium. We do this by looking at the performance of ﬁrms that
have been allocated credit versus those that have been refused. In a separating equilibrium, we would
expect to ﬁnd that accepted ﬁrms are those that are performing better, in terms of sales, growth
26and labour productivity. The data provide us with no evidence of such a separating equilibrium.
The SAFE data allows us to compare Irish ﬁrms’ credit supply and demand changes in the
2009-10 period to matched Eurozone comparator ﬁrms. On credit supply, we ﬁnd that an Irish ﬁrm
is 11-14 percent more likely to be refused credit than a matched PIIGS ﬁrm, and 25-29 percent
more likely to be refused credit than a matched ﬁrm from a non-PIIGS Eurozone country. This
suggests that signiﬁcant credit rationing is present in the Irish SME credit market at present. On
credit demand, we ﬁnd no evidence that Irish ﬁrms have experienced any more of a decline than
comparable ﬁrms across the Eurozone.
Given that this study uses relatively small samples of the Irish SME population, its results
should not be interpreted as ﬁnal and conclusive. The provision of more detailed information on the
ﬁnancing and debt positions of the population (or a large sample thereof) of Irish ﬁrms is needed to
allow such work to take place. Information on Irish SMEs’ debt positions and property investments
would add hugely to studies such as this, as the property-related over-leverage of Irish SMEs is one
potential explanation for a portion of the “Irish rejection premium”. Despite this caveat, the work
on two separate datasets presented here points very much in the same direction, with the broad
conclusion being that Irish SMEs are facing considerable diﬃculties in accessing credit relative to
European peers. A re-correction towards an equilibrium in which a larger share of ﬁrms can access
credit is a crucial component of Irish economic recovery.
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A Supplementary tables
Table 21: Productivity and Growth by Loan Outcome, partially and fully successful ﬁrms
grouped together.
Unsuccessful Successful p-value N
/Partial
Labour Productivity 2008 11.68 11.73 0.78 178
LP % of Frontier, 2008 0.75 0.74 0.63 178
log Sales, 2008 8.25 8.30 0.83 178
Sales growth, %, 2008 -.073 2.57 0.66 129
28Table 22: Eurostat Access to Finance surveys. 2007 breakdown across EU
Accept Partial Reject
Finland 98.1 1.9 0
Ireland red96.9 2.1 1
France 94.5 3.6 2
Malta 94.3 5.7 0
Cyprus 93.2 6.8 0
Belgium 92.4 5.4 2.2
Poland 91.9 4.3 3.7
Denmark 91.8 4.5 3.7
Slovakia 89.3 7 3.7
Lithuania 89.2 9 1.8
Latvia 89 6.7 4.3
United Kingdom 88.4 6.1 5.6
Greece 87.6 11.7 0.7
Spain 87.3 9.7 3
Bulgaria 87 9.9 3.1
Italy 86.6 12.2 1.2
Germany 85.3 8 6.7
Netherlands 84.3 8.9 6.8
Sweden 84.2 7 8.7
Luxembourg 78.8 15.2 6
29Table 23: Eurostat Access to Finance surveys. 2010 breakdown across EU
Accept Partial Reject
Finland 95.9 3.9 0.2
Malta 91.3 6.5 2.2
Poland 85.4 10.3 4.3
France 83.3 9.7 7
Belgium 83.1 11.2 5.7
Sweden 79.7 14.1 6.1
Italy 78.4 16.7 4.9
Cyprus 76.7 19.1 4.2
Slovakia 76.1 14.7 9.2
Germany 75.9 15.9 8.2
Luxembourg 68.4 20.9 10.7
United Kingdom 64.6 14.7 20.8
Latvia 63.5 10.1 26.4
Netherlands 61.3 16.2 22.5
Denmark 59.8 21.7 18.5
Greece 59.6 29.6 10.8
Spain 59.1 27.8 13.2
Lithuania 58.4 20.4 21.2
Ireland red53.2 20.2 26.6
Bulgaria 42.5 22 35.5
30Table 24: Eurostat Access to Finance surveys. Change in ranking according to acceptance
rates, 2007-2010.
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Table 25: SME Loan Rejection Rates in UK
2001-2004 2005-2008 2008
All Firms 6.1 9.4 16.3
By Employment
Size 0 10.4 11.4 19.2
Size 1-9 2.5 6.6 14.5
Size 10-49 2.4 2.5 6.5
Size 50-249 2.9 0.6 1.4
By Risk Level
Min Risk 0 2.8 15.5
Low Risk 9.3 3.7 7.2
Av Risk 2.1 5.3 16.5
High Risk 3.7 13.3 13.5
Source: Frazer (2010)
32Table 26: Comparison to Eastern Europe
Rejected for loan
Country Year No (%) Yes(%) N
Latvia 2005 95 5 184
2009 79 21 87
Estonia 2005 97 3 198
2009 88 12 107
Hungary 2005 99 1 558
2009 93 7 75
Czech Rep. 2005 96 4 314
2009 86 14 88
Source: World Bank/EBRD BEEPS surveys, own calculations.
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